Dalhousie Law Journal
Volume 7

Issue 3

Article 20

10-1-1983

Home Rule for Women: Power-Sharing Between Men and Women
Christine Boyle

Follow this and additional works at: https://digitalcommons.schulichlaw.dal.ca/dlj
Part of the Civil Rights and Discrimination Commons

This work is licensed under a Creative Commons Attribution-Noncommercial-No Derivative
Works 4.0 License.
Recommended Citation
Christine Boyle, “Home Rule for Women: Power-Sharing Between Men and Women”, Comment,
(1982-1983) 7:3 DLJ 790.

This Commentary is brought to you for free and open access by the Journals at Schulich Law Scholars. It has been
accepted for inclusion in Dalhousie Law Journal by an authorized editor of Schulich Law Scholars. For more
information, please contact hannah.steeves@dal.ca.

Christine Boyle*

Home Rule for Women:
Power-Sharing Between Men
and Women

I. Introduction
This paper is about the Canadian electoral system and the need for
reform of its constituent units. Canadian politics have been
remarkable for the comparative lack of interest that has been
displayed in this aspect of the system, an aspect that is of great
importance in any democratic society. In 1949, a speaker at the
annual meeting of the Canadian Political Science Association in
Halifax summed up the situation as follows:
The basic units of representation

. . .

the constituencies, are thus

conceived in the darkness of a legislative committee, and born to
blush unseen on an electoral map which is not readily available to
the public. That our constituencies are a remarkable hodge-podge
is hardly surprising, for the only principle that has been
consistently applied to them is the elementary one that no part of
the country should be left outside an electoral district, and that
was violated once. '
This summation is as accurate today as it was when it was made,
and yet this writer can detect little urgency that our electoral system
be re-examined. 2 This is surprising in view of the practical
connection between the drawing of electoral boundaries and the
power of each individual's vote, and in view of the fact that even a
cursory look at the Canadian political scene would lead one to
suspect that not all interests are being represented. It is submitted
that we cannot long postpone confrontation of the fact that Canada,
and, indeed, all nations, are composed of two sexual groups which
have different traditions and interests. This fact must be
acknowledged in our political structure if we are to end our
complacent acceptance of political decision-making by a minority.
*Professor of Law, Dalhousie University.
1. Ward, The Basis of Representation in the House of Commons (1949) 15 Can. J.
of Econ. and Pol. Sci. 477, at 490.
2. But see, for example, Irvine, "Does Canada Need a New Electoral System?"

(Kingston: Queen's Studies on the Future of the Canadian Communities, 1979).
For a recent outline of Canadian electoral law, see Boyer, Political Rights,
(Toronto: Butterworths, 1981).
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It may well happen that a central constitutional issue in the
twenty-first century, both here and elsewhere, will be the
relationship between men and women. It is now roughly sixty-five
years since women obtained the vote in Canada. 3 As a result, we
have enough experience on which to base an assessment of whether
or not the inclusion of women in a system that was developed by
men for use by men is a suitable method by which to represent the
interests of everyone.
In this paper, the argument is presented that there remain certain
groups, the paradigm being women, who are de facto unenfranchised, and that, for this reason, it is necessary to embark on a
reassessment of our current electoral system. One possible legal
setting for such a reassessment can be found in the Canadian Charter
of Rights 4 if one combines sections 3 and 15(1). Section 3 states
that "every citizen of Canada has the right to vote in an election of
members of the House of Commons or of a legislative assembly and
to be qualified for membership therein." Section 15(1) states that
"every individual is equal before and under the law and has the
right to the equal protection and equal benefit of the law without
discrimination, and, in particular, without discrimination based on
race, national or ethnic origin, colour, religion, sex, age or mental
or physical disability." ' 5 Thus, it is submitted that ensuring every
Canadian the right to vote does not merely confer on each the right
to cast a ballot in a physical sense. Rather, in combination with the
right to equal benefit of the law, it grants the right to cast a vote
which has the chance of being equally as effective as any other vote,
that is, an equal chance of electing a person who will represent the
interests of the voter; it grants the right to political equality. In this
context, I suggest that political equality does not mean that we all
have a right to have our interests represented (for that would, in
effect, yield direct democracy), but that our votes suffer no special

3. See Cleverdon, The Woman Suffrage Movement in Canada (2nd. ed., Toronto:
University of Toronto Press, 1974). It is interesting, and supportive of the
argument presented in this paper, that in Nova Scotia, women arguably regained
the vote in 1918 as they had been expressly disqualified in 1851. See Revised
Statutes of Nova Scotia, 1851, Supplement, at 59.
4. Canadian Charter of Rights and Freedoms, Canada Act, 1982 (U.K.).
5. Section 15 is, of course, subject to section 32(2), which requires a three-year
delay.
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weakness by reason of our sex, colour, religion, etc. 6 In assessing
whether each citizen is equal in a political sense, we must take into
account all actual barriers (as opposed to only legal ones). This
point will be developed more fully later, but a simple example may
be useful by way of introduction. Assume that the Canadian voting
rule holds that all Canadians must gather in Bethlemen, Ontario, in
order to vote. Theoretically, all have the same right, but, in
practice, all are not equal in their ability to exercise that right. The
poor cannot afford to travel long distances, and the ill and elderly
may find it impossible to travel at all. Parents may not be able to
arrange for their young children to be cared for while they travel to
vote. It is obvious that the closer one is to Bethlehem, the more one
actually has the right to vote.
The subject of this paper can, therefore, be loosely classified as
that of political rights under the constitution and, more precisely, as
the creation of a structure which encourages the representation of
diverse groups and interests. Although the focus is on the
representation of women, my assumption is that an adequate
analysis of that issue would provide the basis on which to assess the
representation of other distinctive groups. The title appealed to me
because of its overtones of Irishness 7 and political independence,
and because of its reference to a concept which has been and still is
central to the lives of many women, that of the home. By way of
further introduction, I would like to make the somewhat self-serving
claim that the representation of women is not a subject which could
legitimately be regarded as one of narrow focus. An underlying
assumption of my thesis is that the analysis of political rights,
constitutions, or anything which confines its scope to male reality is
6. I realize that I am on shaky ground with a concept of this nature. I suppose that,
if pushed, I would try to define it by saying that it means a system in which the
chances of electing people who will ensure that all interests are taken into account
in decision-making are maximized. If the system leaves and continues to leave
certain interests unrepresented, then we do not have political equality. This is very
nearly asserting a test of outcomes to judge a process, and that may well be worth
exploring. For example, I find attractive the operational definition of political
equality adopted in Mansbridge's Living with Conflict: Representation in the
Theory of Adversary Democracy (1981), 91 Ethics, 466, at 472. It is "that system
which in practice meets . . criteria from universal suffrage through proportional
group representation and power sharing, judged by the overarching standard of
proportional outcomes .... "
7. This seems appropriate in this context, given the various forms that colonialism
takes, as well as the fact that the Irish have a system of proportional representation.
See O'Leary, Irish Elections (New York: St. Martin's Press, 1979).
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of necessity narrow and not in the mainstream of human experience.
Hence, discussion of a topic such as this will tend to render existing
analyses of representation more universal, and is, therefore, not
peripheral. Adequate analysis of any subject should take place in the
context of the full range of human reality and should not be
artificially limited by the world-view of one sex, as has been largely
the case in the past. Therefore, I ask the reader to see this not as the
bump on the log of existing thought on representation, but as an
attempt to start pushing the log underneath an existing bump. 8
1I.

Why Is There a Needfor Change?

A starting point for the demonstration that reform is necessary can
be found in the vast literature on election systems in general. This
paper will not cover that already well-trodden ground again, but will
merely use the arguments for proportional representation as a
stepping stone to more neglected issues. The claim is made,
8. I am indebted for inspiration on this approach to Lorenne Clark and her
significant essay entitled "Politics and the Law: The Theory and Practice of the
Ideology of Male Supremacy", in Weisstub, ed., Law and Policy (Toronto:
Butterworths, 1976). She states at 35 and 36 that:
[I]t is my belief, and that of other feminist scholars in this and related fields, that
one assumption that has not yet reached the light of day is that of sexual
inequality and the superiority of the male sex. It now seems to me certain that
politics, the theory on which it is based, and the practice and practices arising
out of it, including of course law and legal theory, articulates an ideology of
male supremacy. Politics is the ideology of male supremacy, or, one might say,
the ideology of male supremacy is the conceptual meta- or super-structure
which is assumed at the foundation of political and legal theory.
I have attempted to apply this idea to my thinking about the exercise of political
rights, that is, the idea that the practices arising out of the political theory on which
our present electoral system is based articulate an ideology of male supremacy.
It may be suggested that if we simply attempt to utilize language that is non-sexist,
theories that have hitherto been stated in terms that relate only to men can be
broadened to include women, that we simply need to remember to say "he or she"
in order to render a theoretical structure valid or useful for all humanity, but this is
to ignore important differences between the sexes. Just as we have to re-examine
philosophical and political theories which treat women as invisible (for example, in
Marxist philosophy women don't appear until they emerge as workers and
members of a class), so do we have to re-examine our constitutional and political
structure and ask ourselves the simple question: is it suitable for everyone? Or, is it
even suitable for most people? In other words, it is vital to confront the narrow
sexist orientation of legal and political theorists to date. See also, Rich, "Toward a
Woman-Centered University", in Howe, ed., Women and Power to Change at 15
et seq., and Rifkin, "Toward a Theory of Law and Patriarchy", (1980) 3 Harvard
Women's Law Journal, 83.
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therefore, that our present form of liberal democracy does not in fact
ensure the representation of individuals, even in a majoritarian
sense. Decisions are made in stages, so that voters who have "lost"
at one level may not be represented, and the ultimate result may be
rule by a minority. This is the practically inevitable result of
dividing a political unit up into geographical constituencies.
Perhaps a simple illustration would be useful. Weale 9 provides a
telling example through the case of two constituencies, each of
which has three voters. Each constituency is unanimous and
opposed to the views of the other; Constituency One favours X and
Constituency Two favours Y. Now, if one voter in Constituency
Two changes her mind, there will be a majority in favour of X. This
ought to decide the issue, but in our system the situation would
remain deadlocked. Weale's conclusion is that a weakening of
individualism is "necessary to accommodate the practical demands
of geographical constituencies..."10 Deadlock remains because
the views of the voter who has changed her mind count for nothing
because she is a minority member of her constituency, even though
her views would be decisive if combined with those of voters from
the other constituencies. Similarly, her views are insignificant in the
common situation, in which the majority of voters in each
constituency favours Y; that is, only one person in each
constituency favours X. Thus, view X is totally unrepresented. I
understand this, in simple terms, to be the situation which spawned
proposals to introduce electoral systems based on proportional
representation." I simply state my claim that, irrespective of any
other electoral reform, the case has been made against the existing
"first-past-the-post" system and for some form of proportional
representation.
However, this in itself would not be enough to ensure political
equality. More radical change merits consideration on the basis of
the point alluded to earlier, namely, that we must examine the
realities of the franchise. Empirical evidence, therefore, underlines
the argument for more radical reform, in combination with the

9. "Representation, Individualism, and Collectivism", (1981) 91 (No. 3) Ethics,

457.
10. Ibid, at 461.
11. See, for example, the Task Force on Canadian Unity, A Future Together, at
104 et seq., where a limited degree of proportional representation is proposed for
the House of Commons.
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acceptance of certain values. 12 It may be helpful at this point to state
the relevant factual and political assertions.
First, men and women differ in a variety of ways which can be
roughly classified as natural and man-made, the latter category
tending to obscure and hamper empirical study of the former. Men
and women are different biologically, primarily in their contributions to reproduction, but most of the remaining differences are
probably artificial. For example, the legal history of women differs
substantially from that of men, as does their working and economic
history. Their ways of expressing themselves artistically seem to be
different and have been treated differently, and women live in a
world in which words that are commonly used hide their
existence.' 3 Most significantly in this context, women have a
different political history. At least some men have had a long
tradition of political activity, and those who don't can study politics
in which people with an important resemblance to them (namely,
gender) have played a significant role. Women, on the other hand,
have no such equivalent tradition. In fact, their tradition is marked
by the absence of political role models and by opposition to their
efforts at emancipation. 14 An analogy can be drawn with countries
where two or more significantly different groups exist, as they do in
Northern Ireland, Lebanon, Guyana, certain countries in Africa
(such as Zimbabwe), and, indeed, in Canada itself. A study of
electoral systems throughout the world shows us that in such
situations, there can be no complacent assumption that a
first-past-the-post system, with constituencies based on geography
5
and numbers, will inspire the confidence of the electorate.
12. What I mean by this can be illustrated. We can prove empirically that women
are poorer than men on the whole. Yet that in itself is not significant. To become
significant, it needs to be combined with the belief that it is not a good thing.
13. Katz, Her and His: Language of Equal Value, A Report of the Status of
Women Committee of the Nova Scotia Confederation of University Faculty
Associations on Sexist Language and the University, with Guidelines, 1981.
14. See, generally, Cleverdon, supra, n. 3.
15. For some examples and analysis, see the chapter on Communal Representation
in the leading work by MacKenzie, Free Elections (London: George Allen and
Unwin Ltd., 1957). He cites the Govemment of India Act of 1935 as establishing
ten separate electorates. He defines, at 32, a system of communal representation as
"one which gives first place to non-territorial considerations in forming
constituencies; it links together voters from the whole country on the basis of
characteristics other than that of attachment to a particular locality." I think it is
fair to say that he is very negative about the whole idea, feeling that it would be
impractical in operation even if it was necessitated by political realities.
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At the risk of stating the obvious, it is important to point out that
we do not perceive men and women as being different in the same
way that we accept the differences between Catholics and
Protestants, Hindus and Moslems, and black and white people. And
yet, if we do not permit their familiarity to obscure them, the
differences are dramatic.
Imagine a country in which all or most of the women, but not the
men, lived in one geographical area - for example, Ontario. One
can then examine the laws applying to and the economic position of
"Ontarians" from a neutral standpoint. It will be found that the
position of Ontarians is not good in Canadian society. They have
been systematically discriminated against throughout their history;
for example, their property was taken from them without
compensation, they had no rights to their children, enfranchisement
was ridiculed and bitterly opposed, and they still rarely sit in
Parliament or on the bench. They are subjected to assault and sexual
abuse by non-Ontarians, and they largely work at menial tasks for
which they are paid much less than non-Ontarians, or nothing. In
addition, they are depicted ever more widely by various media as
being less than human, as objects for the sexual gratification of
non-Ontarians. One has only to attempt such an account to realize
that there exist two fundamentally different groups in Canada (and,
of course, elsewhere). It is submitted that an electoral system which
16
does not reflect any confrontation of that fact is inadequate.
Second, our present political system is not satisfactory to women
in the sense that, to put the best possible construction on the very
low rate of participation by women in public life, they have voted
with their feet. It is ironic that one argument put forward for
denying women the vote' 7 was that they would not use it, and a
variation of that argument might now be that women are not
interested in political activity. That fact, if true, is in itself deeply
disturbing. If it is true that women as a group do not choose to
16. "Those who claim to represent profoundly divided nations or families, which
like lunatics have no settled judgment to represent, are rightly regarded with
skepticism." Rogowski, "Representation in Political Theory and Law" (1981), 91
Ethics, 395 at 398. He gives the example of the Stormont Parliament in Northern
Ireland. A claim by the Protestant Government to represent Northern Ireland would
be unlikely to be taken seriously. He put it in another way, at 395: "To require
equally powerful representation . . . of a system of single-member, plurality
districts in a society of predictable political, racial and ethnic [and, I would add,
sexual] divisions is . . . to demand that the circle be squared."
17. See Cleverdon, supra, n. 3.
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participate in the political system, other than as voters, then that is
in itself a sufficient reason to contemplate reform. To take any other
attitude is surely to contemplate with complacency the alienation of
the majority of the population from the political process. This writer
concludes that a strategy of assimilation has been proved
unsuccessful, possibly because most men and women never really
wanted it to work. Therefore, it may well be time to consider a
strategy of separation.' 8 In fact, we are already seeing signs of that
in the recent constitutional lobbying.
Third, the present system is simply not successful at ensuring the
representation of the interests of women. An examination of the
facts of Canadian life provides the clearest demonstration that the
interests of men and women are diverse, partly because they have
been made to be so. Even a superficial survey of the literature shows
that, as a group, women are poorer than men. 19 They are
discriminated against in employment 20 and with respect to
pensions, 2 1 as well as in the areas of fundamental rights and
freedoms, 22 child care, and the whole issue of domestic work and
child-rearing. Given this, it seems reasonable to conclude that it is
impossible for men to represent women. This might not always be

18. See Freedman, "Separatism as Strategy: Female Institution Building and
American Feminism" 1870-1930 (1979) 5 Feminist Studies, 512. She concludes,
at 513, that at "certain historical periods, the creation of a public female sphere
might be the only viable political strategy for women."
19. See Women and Poverty, National Council of Welfare, 1979. This report,
which does not include Indian women, shows that one out of six Canadian women
are poor, as compared to one in nine Canadian men.
20. See, for example, Dale, "Women and Jobs: The Impact of Federal
Government Employment Strategies on Women", Canadian Advisory Council on
the Status of Women, Ottawa, 1980.
21. See, for example, Retirement Without Tears, Report of the Special Senate
Committee on Retirement Age Policies, Ottawa, 1979.
22. See Baines, "Women, Human Rights and the Constitution", in Doerr and
Carrier, eds., Women and the Constitution, Canadian Advisory Council on the
Status of Women, 1981. For a sense of how time stands still, see Wollstonecraft,
Vindication of the Rights of Women, Penguin Books, 1792. For an overview of all
of these areas, see Carrier, "Women's Rights and 'National Interests' ", in
Women and the Constitution, supra.
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the case and it might not be universal, but I believe it to be so
23
substantially true as to render reform necessary.
Finally, the relative lack of influence that women suffer at the
present time is related to the fact that individuals can find it difficult
to relate to the state, as individual interests must often be mediated
through group or corporate attachments. 24 This puts a premium on
political organization, which will be more or less suitable for
different types of people. 25 For example, those who have a tradition
of political organization and some familiarity with the exercise of
power have an obvious advantage. Marone and Marmor 2 6 discuss
this in the context of what they call "unbalanced political
arenas". 2 7 Organizational ability will vary with a number of
factors, such as ease and cost, the lack of concentration of benefits
and people, the diffusivity of issues, and a lack of experience and
resources.
In summary, then, the argument for the system to be reformed, in
an attempt to promote the representation of women, is as follows:
1. Our present system is defective because the first-past-the-post
system, with constituencies based on geography, leaves many
people, probably the majority, unrepresented.
2. Our present system is also defective in that men do not represent
women.
3. Even if we moved to a system of proportional representation,
this would not mean that representatives of women would be
23. Perhaps a more effective way of making the same point would be to suggest
that asking men to represent women is like asking Upper Canadians to represent
Newfoundlanders. The two groups seem to have substantially different traditions
and interests, and asserting that they are all Canadian would hardly alleviate the
concern caused by this fact. There is no dearth of appropriate analogies. For
example, it seems clear now that Northern Irish Catholics were unrepresented by
Protestant members of the Stormont Parliament. See Hadden and Hillyard, Justice
in Northern Ireland, A Study in Social Confidence (London: Cobden Trust, 1973).
The authors state, at 5, that the "minority long considered the Unionist movement
to be totally unresponsive to any form of reasoned argument on matters which
concerned the allocation of political power ....
"It is clear that at some point
members of one group feel that someone belonging to another group has such a
conflict of interest that representation is impossible, or at least unlikely.
24. Hegel, Philosophy of Right, trans. T. M. Knox (Oxford: Clarendon Press,
1952) at 253.
25. An obvious example is that of poor people who work at caring for their
children. They might find it impossible to engage in political activity.
26. "Representing Consumer Interests: The Case of American Health Planning"
(1981), 91 (No. 3) Ethics, 431.
27. lbid, at 445, et seq.
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elected. Some further change is necessary in order to overcome the
inability and/or unwillingness of women to participate in the
political structure.
III. What FurtherChange is Needed?
The central issue which needs to be confronted in the future relates
to the delineation of constituencies. The factor which predominated
in the past has been geography, and yet it is not at all clear why it is
more significant than sex, race, or economic factors. We are
extremely familiar with the idea that an identifiable group has
interests, traditions, and values in common, such that it forms a
political entity separate from other entities. We are familiar with
this idea in the form of nationalism, although we may not be at all
clear as to why a group seems to form a nation. We are also familiar
with it in the semi-nationalistic sense of the units of a federal state.
The idea that the interests of the residents of Nova Scotia might
differ from those of the residents of Ontario in such a way that the
two groups should be separate for some political purposes does not
sound dangerously radical to us. And yet we lump numbers of two
very different groups, men and women, together for political
purposes simply because they live in close proximity to each other.
Is there not room for compromise between our present system and
total separatism?
It is therefore submitted that we need to consider a move away
from geographical constituencies. We must begin to address the
fundamental issues relating to the question of which constituencies
ought to be represented. It is not my purpose at this stage to suggest
a fully developed feminist electoral system, but it is useful to think
through some of the possibilities.
There are various ways in which we could ensure the election of
women and thus promote the representation of women. They vary in
radicalism and complexity, depending on what decisions are
reached with respect to the compromise between competing values.
One simple method which would maximize the present link between
the representative and the constituency would be to retain
geography as a very significant factor and create dual-member
constituencies, with one man and one woman elected. 28 This would
28. There are some dual constituencies in Nova Scotia, discussed in the Select
Committee on Electoral Boundaries, Preliminary Report, November 1977. The
Select Committee felt that they had the benefit of enabling the election of different
types of people, for example, an Acadian and an Anglo-Saxon in Yarmouth
County, and a Protestant and a Catholic in Inverness.
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have various drawbacks: women would be somewhat underrepresented in relation to their numbers and the system would not be
adaptable for other groups. In addition, I think that, since it leaves
the present system largely intact, it holds out the least hope for any
radical change in Canadian party politics. I would urge, instead,
that we look further and examine the idea of female constituencies;
in other words, it is suggested that sex should be a factor in the
drawing of electoral boundaries. This could be accomplished in a
number of ways, of which the following is a possibility.
Because Canada is so large, the practical difficulties of
abandoning geographical constituencies completely might overwhelm the benefits of attempting to achieve political equality.
However, the federal structure could be advantageously used in this
context to enable geographical or regional divisions to be
maintained for the limited purpose of permitting local decisionmaking with respect to matters of purely regional interest. 29 On the
provincial level, two options are available. Constituencies could be
redrawn to permit the separate election of both male and female
representatives from each constituency. This would be done
preferably through use of the system of proportional representation,
so that male and female constituencies would, in effect, be overlaid
upon each other. Alternatively, each province could simply become
one constituency, so that any single group which was the size of an
average constituency at present would be able to elect a
representative. 30 The question of whether there would be a separate
geographical element or totally self-selecting constituencies would
depend on the value placed on both the convenience and the
constituency attachment. The appropriate level of compromise
would require a balancing of the different factors that would
29. It is not the purpose of this paper to examine the question of the appropriate
federal/provincial division, but I would suggest that, as far as de facto
unenfranchised groups are concerned, this analysis would tend to minimize the
areas of purely local interest as the division prevents cooperation with members of
the same groups in other provinces. Thus, it dissipates political energy.
30. Perhaps the closest analysis comes from J. S. Mill, Considerations on
Representative Government (London: Longmans, Green & Co., 1867) in Chapter
8. There he discusses the securing of adequate representation for all shades of
opinion. He argues, in essence, that people of sufficient numbers to make up a
constituency should be able to elect a representative, no matter where they are
situated

geographically.

Self-selected

constituencies

would

be

superior to

geographical constituencies, since political opinions have no necessary connection
to place of residence.
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promote effective representation. 3 ' For example, the importance of
convenience obviously becomes much greater at the federal level,
and a combination of geographical and other factors, such as sex,
would have to be used. Whatever system is chosen, however, it will
be crucial to ensure that women's votes be counted together, so that
the power of such votes is not dissipated among various political
units. In this way, men would not be elected by default, as it were,
and our political system would, in effect, be balancing the otherwise
"unbalanced political arenas".
Being recognized as a political group is, of course, a tremendous
advantage. Nova Scotia, for example, would seem to have more
influence than any equivalent number of people in Canada.
Likewise, Canadians have more influence on world affairs than any
random group of twenty-five million people. Thus, just as
provincehood and nationhood can lend influence, so the recognition
of women as a group would increase their power considerably. Men
and women would, in effect, be sharing power.
The idea that identifiable interest groups should be represented is,
of course, not a new one. Birch, in Representative and Responsible
Government, 32 asserts, with respect to the famous British Reform
Act of 1932, that:
The argument that Parliamentary decisions would be biased
unless the House of Commons directly represented all the
interests in the nation seemed sensible and had obvious
attractions for spokesmen from the expanding urban areas who
felt that the existing representation of industrial and commercial
33
interests was grossly inadequate.
Elements of a similar analysis can be found in the literature on the
aspirations associated with Quebec separatism, 3 4 and to move
closer to home, W. A. MacKay, President of Dalhousie University
and former Dean of the Faculty of Law, has asserted the need for
recognition of different groups in our society. He states that:
[T]here are perhaps more interpretations of Confederation than
31. It is, of course, possible to have a mixed system, as suggested by the Task
Force on Canadian Unity, supra, n. II. It proposed a mixed first-past-the-post,
proportional representation system.
32. Published by the University of Toronto Press, 1964.
33. Ibid, at 50. One might add mildly that such spokesmen had obviously not
thought through the implications of their position.
34. For example, see Trudeau, "Federalism, Nationalism and Reason", in
Crepeau and MacPherson, eds., The Future of Canadian Federalism (Toronto:
University of Toronto Press, 1965).
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• . . that of a unitary state and that of a union of two peoples with
distinct cultures . . . [T]here is nothing sacrosanct about equality
of status for constituent units with a federation . . . After all we
have never really had a federation of equals, either in the ethnic
grouping of peoples in this land or among the provinces and yet
our constitution . . . has thus far failed to take full account of
inequalities. Neither the French fact nor the non-French fact
should be ignored in our constitution. Nor should other
differences be ignored ... 35
Full-blown analysis of what has been called the "mirror" theory
of representation can be found in the American literature, and
thorough linguistic analysis can be found in Pitkin, The Concept of
Representation.36 She states the following, by way of introduction:
Other writers require that the legislature be a "mirror" of the
nation or of public opinion . . . Representative government, they
tell us, means "accurate reflection" of the community, or of the
general opinion of the nation, or of the variety of interests in
society . . . Hence Sidney and Beatrice Webb judge the British
House of Lords to be "the worst representative assembly ever
created, in that it contains absolutely no members of the manual
working class; none of the great class of shopkeepers, clerks and
teachers; none of the half of all the citizens who are the female
sex. 37
Not only is there discussion and abstract analysis of the theory in the
United States, but there is also a certain amount of literature on its
application. Such applications appeared both in the form of
challenges in the courts to electoral systems and in the context of
non-legislative bodies (either elected or non-elected), members of
which are supposed to have a representative function.
To take the case law first, complex constitutional questions
(which are, arguably, now relevant here) have arisen when
legislatures have tried to establish voting districts along racial lines
in order to increase the political power of racial minorities that have
experienced discrimination. Such positive action has been regarded

35. Ibid, at 171 and 172.

36. See the chapter entitled " 'Standing For': Descriptive Representation", in
Pitkin, The Concept of Representation (University of California Press, 1967) at 60

et seq.
37. Ibid, at 61.
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as necessary because of the resultant alienation of powerless groups
38
which have come to be deeply cynical about the political system.
In these cases, electoral statutes have been successfully challenged
on the basis that they operate to dilute or cancel the voting strength
of racial or political groups. 39 However, the position of the United
States Supreme Court has been summed up as follows:
[It] recognizes the constitutional right of each individual to
participate on an equal basis in the community's political process
and to enjoy an undiluted vote [but] denies any constitutional
40
right of groups to proportional political representation.
Hence, the United States has reached the point of recognizing a
right to equal access to the process, but has not recognized a
constitutional right to be represented. While useful analogies with
the American attempt to ensure that the voting power of blacks is
not diluted can be drawn, 4 ' such an analysis does not go far enough.
This is so for the following reasons:
1. No theory that certain groups ought to be represented has been
accepted by the courts.
2. The constitutional issues in the United States are focussed on
problems relating to communities, such as blacks and Mexican
Americans, who sometimes cluster together, whereas women are
spread much more evenly throughout the community.
3. The problem of non-legal barriers to political participation is not
addressed.
Nevertheless, the very fact that the interests of groups are being
thought about in the United States is of interest to us. Further
evidence of this trend was apparent at the trial court level in the
leading case of Whitcomb v. Chavis.42 In this case, the judge found,
on an empirical level, that blacks in a ghetto had distinctly different
interests in terms of housing conditions, income and educational
38. One writer suggests that "neutral distinctions may not be effective because
minority voters have come to believe that the political system will ignore their
interests." Note, Proportional Representation by Race. The Constitutionality of
Benign Racial Redistricting(1976) 74 Mich. L.R. 820 at 838.
39. For an enunciation of this test, see, for example, Whitcomb v. Chavis 403 U.S.
124(1971).
40. Note, supra, n. 38 at 822.
41. Interestingly, the argument can go both ways, both for and against single
member districts. Both systems of multi-member districts and systems of
single-member constituencies can dilute the voting power of blacks. Whitcomb v.
Chavis, supra, n. 39 at 156.
42. 305 F. Supp. 1364, at 1380.

804 The Dalhousie Law Journal

levels, rates of employment and welfare assistance. Hence, they had
"compelling interests in such legislative areas as urban renewal and
rehabilitation, health care, employment training and opportunities,
welfare

. . .

law enforcement,

quality of education

and anti-

43
discrimination measures."
The remainder of the American material deals with the
application of the concept in certain contexts, for example, in urban
politics or consumer representation. Greenstone and Peterson, in

Race and Authority in Urban Politics: Consumer Participationand

the War on Poverty, 44 provide an interesting example, although it is
difficult to do them justice in summary. Their book discusses the
Community Action Programs that were set up by the Office of
Economic Opportunity in an attempt to further President Johnson's
celebrated war on poverty. Since the Economic Opportunity Act
required a degree of community participation, 45 research and
analysis of that aspect is relevant to the topic of this paper.
Greenstone and Peterson discuss the justification for community
participation in terms of "political poverty", as follows:
The poor . . . lack such political resources as stable financing,

social prestige and easy access to decision-makers. Generally,
they were known for low voter turnout

. . .

and for the relative

ease with which their vote could be "controlled" by strong party
organizations. Most important, the poor had few autonomous
organizations which could articulate their collective demands and
recognize their electoral influence . . . In sum, poverty had a

46
politicalas well as an economic dimension.

In other words, the "poor" were treated as a separate constituency
in an attempt to redress their lack of power. One can readily think of
bodies, both elected and non-elected, to which separate constituencies send representatives, presumably in order to ensure that vital
interests are not ignored. This is a fairly common practice on
tribunals and boards, such as labour relations boards, 4 7 and is an

43. Ibid.

44. University of Chicago Press, 1973, ch. 6.
45. U.S. Congress, An Act to Mobilize the Human and FinancialResources of the
Nation to Combat Poverty in the United States, Public Law 88-452, 88th Cong.,
2nd Sess., 1964, at 9. See also Cahn and Cahn, The War on Poverty: A Civilian
Perspective(1964), 73 Yale L.J. 1317.
46. Supra, n. 44, at 4.
47. Weiler, The Administrative Tribunal: A View From the Inside (1976), 26
University of Toronto L.J. 193.
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obvious possibility when one thinks, for example, of a process for
the appointment of judges. 4 8
IV. Some Possible Problems
A system of separate male and female constituencies might attract
the criticism that it has the potential of producing the election of
dogmatic and doctrinaire members who would not join in the
normal political process of negotiation and compromise. Several
responses can be made to this. First, the present appearance of
consensus, if such exists, occurs at the cost of simply ignoring
significant interests in our society. There is no reason to suppose
that the advocates of these interests would be any less willing to
compromise than present representatives. What might be achieved
is what could more accurately be called compromise. Second, the
argument is not based on the assumption that all women share the
same views, never mind holding them in a doctrinaire fashion.
Rather, I assume that women, like men, have a wide range of
political views. The interests that women share have arisen because
sexual differences have historically been treated by men as being
highly significant. Surely the political process would work very
much as it does now, with a high premium being placed on the
ability to be effective and to work with other groups in order to
achieve this. Does anyone now suggest that unions should be
discarded because they engage in confrontation? To the contrary,
unions are necessary because certain groups need to be confronted
in order to create a balance of power. Of course, it would be better if
different interests could be balanced without confrontation, but the
process normally leads to compromise.
A related criticism might hold that if our interests are so
profoundly divided that representation of particular groups has to be
guaranteed in the Constitution, then such representation will
increase sexual and other forms of animosity. My response to this
point is simply that I hope that maximizing the chances of

48. "In February, 1977, President Carter set up a Commission to recommend
candidates for appointment to the United States Courts of Appeal . . . Each panel
.. . 'shall include members of both sexes, members of minority groups and
approximately equal numbers of lawyers and non-lawyers.' " See Deschenes, "On
the Selection of Judges," in his book of essays entitled The Sword and the Scales

(Toronto: Butterworths, 1979) at 209.
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representation of all groups would decrease animosity, since it
would provide a channel for the effective removal of grievances. 49
V. The Identification of Constituencies
If it is accepted that it is unsatisfactory to leave significant interests
unrepresented in our legislative bodies, then the main issue that
arises is the problem of identifying interests that are relevant. The
issue that has to be confronted is stated concisely by Marone and
Marmor in the consumer context:
Establishing representative institutions requires fundamental
choices. Decisions must be made about the selection of
representatives, what those representatives should be like, and
the expectations that should govern their behaviour. Whom to
represent - the constituencies - is a central puzzle where
50
geographic representation is abandoned.
In any society, the response to this "central puzzle" will reflect its
commitment to certain basic values (which is why I think the choice
is appropriately stated in a constitution). In addition, it will indicate
what a particular society wants to achieve through its laws - for
example, sexual equality, the eradication of poverty, and respect for
minority rights.
While it is helpful to have an issue clearly stated, an answer to
this puzzle is not readily forthcoming, a problem which constitutes a
major stumbling block for writers in this area. 51 I have suggested a
general test of de facto unenfranchisement, but that merely provides
another way of presenting the same question. The crucial step is that
of identifying factors which could legitimately lead to a conclusion
that one could label using that terminology.
The assumption on which the concept is based is that a vote per se
does not successfully enfranchise. Successful enfranchisement
entails that one be able to exercise the right to vote in a system and a
49. It is argued thus, in Note, Compensatory Racial Reapportionment (1972) 25
Stanford L.R. 84, that "benign segregation" on racial lines would help focus
attention on minority problems, make the legislature more responsive, and thus
decrease racial animosity.
50. Representing Consumer Interests: The Case of American Health Planning
(1981) 91 (No. 3) Ethics 431, at 434.
51. Ibid, at 437. "Mirror views provide few guidelines for selecting which social
characteristics merit representation." Weale, Representation, Individualism, and
Collectivism (1981) 91 (No. 3) Ethics, 457, at 464. "Clearly an important
problem in a collectivist theory of representation is determining which groups are to
be represented."
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setting which are not weighted, in a discriminatory way, against the
possibility of the vote being effective in electing a representative
who will protect one's interests. The interests of a group which is de
facto unenfranchised will inevitably be subordinated to the interests
of other groups. At the very best, such a group will be infantilised
and dependent on the good will of the enfranchised. What factors,
then, go to a determination of de facto unenfranchisement? It is
suggested that at least a start can be made in the direction of
resolving this issue.
Analogies may be drawn with factors which seem to make sense
when we are thinking about the boundaries of a state. As I have
suggested earlier, there may be a compromise between complete
separatism and complete submission into political units, dominated
(for whatever reason) by another group. We know that it is
impossible to come up with a logical answer to questions about
national boundaries and there seem to be some that we can only
observe, rather than rationally defend. These are natural boundaries, such as rivers and mountains, linguistic differences,
differences in history, and direct communication from the Holy
Ghost. 52 In fact, there may be a variety of reasons why a fragile
national consensus exists:
The formation of such a consensus is a mysterious process which
takes in many elements, such as language, communication,
association, geographical proximity, tribal origins, common
interests and history, external pressures, and even foreign
intervention, none of which, however, is a determinant by itself.
A consensus can be said to exist when no group within the nation
feels that the vital interests and particular characteristics could be
better preserved 5 by
withdrawing from the nation than by
3
remaining within.
One can easily apply this concept to Northern Ireland, which
provides a useful example as two distinct groups live there and a
simple redrawing of state boundaries would not satisfy either. Given
an assumption of the continuation of the state (a big assumption
with respect to Northern Ireland, but an obvious one with respect to
states, in general, in which men and women both live), some
constitutional method has to be found by which respect for the
element of sexual diversity can be displayed.

52. Trudeau, supra, n. 34, at 19 and 20.
53. Ibid, at 22.
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With respect to women, while it can be established, as I hope I
have already done, that a distinct group exists, a test of whether the
group "feels" that it would be better off if it separated from the
larger group is not appropriate, given the reality of the way men and
women share their lives and, no doubt, will continue to. I would
suggest, instead, that we attempt to work with some kind of
objective test. Such a test would determine whether or not the vital
interests and characteristics of the group would be better preserved
by a system which ensured the presence of some of its members in
legislative bodies. The alternative would be for the more powerful
group simply to exploit the fact that separatism, in its traditional
form, is not a viable option for the less powerful group. An
objective test takes us back to the empirical results of our existing
system. With those results in mind, and with some assistance from
American electoral law, 5 4 it seems possible to suggest some factors
which are relevant to a determination of de facto disenfranchisement:
1. a history of social, economic, and political discrimination
against the affected group;
2. a consistent inability and/or unwillingness of members of the
group to gain election;
3. evidence of sexual voting - that is, men voting for male
candidates because of their sex - and of political organization
along sexual lines;
4. sexist campaign tactics;
5. minimal chances of influencing elections.
Although these factors are phrased in terms of sexual differences,
it is suggested that they could be adapted for use by other groups.
However, this is not to reject the argument that the male/female
distinction is fundamental and that the position of women is, in
many respects, unique. No other group enjoys the distinction of
being a disadvantaged majority. Thus, evidence pointing to the
exclusion and alienation of such a group has a very special
significance in the context of electoral reform.
VI. Conclusion
In summary, it is argued that some form of separate representation
of women should be considered for inclusion in our electoral
system. This argument is based on the factual evidence that men
54. White v. Regester 412 U.S. 755 (1973).
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have been unable or unwilling to represent the interests of women,
and that women seem unable or unwilling to participate in the
political system as it is presently constituted. As long as members of
one group are obliged by another group to have a relatively narrow
range of choices - that is, to have less power to do - then it can be
argued that their distinctive separateness, inherent in their
disadvantaged status, must be recognized and addressed in our
system if we want to make any significant changes. Therefore, it is
proposed that a form of benign segregation is worthwhile
considering, at least on a temporary basis, in order to ensure
representation of women by women and, I hope, in the interests of
women.5
55. It is not just the results of mirror representation that justify it. The process itself
may have advantages. Weale, supra, n. 51, at 464, argues that people "may well
value the knowledge that someone who shares a prominent characteristic with them
(for example, race, sex or age) participates in the making of certain decisions." At
the very least, the fact that a representative shares some basic characteristic is
"knowable". This is an advantage, since in our present system, it is often difficult
to know if a decision is against one's interest or not.

